MasterFeeds: February 2021

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Feb 28, 2021

Chinese loans to Latin America plunge as virus strains ties

Chinese loans to Latin America plunge as virus strains ties
while the pandemic has opened the door to much-welcomed Chinese aid, it's also made it harder for governments to pay their bills to Beijing

deep 7.4% recession in Latin America and the Caribbean last year wiped out nearly a decade's worth of growth, according to International Monetary Fund data.

Chinese loans to Latin America plunge as virus strains ties

MIAMI (AP) — It seemed like a match made in finance heaven.

In 2010, China, its economy roaring and state companies looking to expand globally, set its eyes on Latin America, a region starved of capital but rich in natural resources the Asian giant lacked. The result: a record $35 billion in state-to-state loans that year.

Fast forward a decade and the once-torrid relationship is starting to mature in ways that suggest China may be growing wary of its once do-no-wrong partner.

For the first time in 15 years, China's two biggest policy banks — the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China — made no new loans to the region in 2020, capping a multi-year slump driven by Latin America's worsening economic slide.

The data comes from a new repor t by the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank, and Boston University's Global Development Policy Center, both of which have been tracking for years China's yuan diplomacy in Washington's backyard.

China's growing economic and diplomatic influence in the region has worried U.S. policymakers, who have been at a loss to counter its rise. The task now falls to the Biden administration, which has warned that the Chinese footprint in the region is a national security threat. But with China having displaced the U.S. as the top trading partner of several South American nations, catching up will be no easy task.

Meanwhile, the U.S. may have fallen even farther behind during the pandemic, when China donated more than $215 million in supplies — from surgical gloves to thermal imaging technologies — to allies in the region, according to the research. By comparison, the United State Agency for International Development and State Department has provided $153 million. China also conducted clinical trials or plans to manufacture vaccines in five countries — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru.

"Without a doubt part of the region's COVID response has a Chinese face," said Rebecca Ray, a Boston University economist and one of the authors of the new report. "It's a missed opportunity for the U.S. but since the bottoming out of American manufacturing in the 1990s there's really no way to compete. Many of the same medical supplies China ships to Latin America we buy from China as well."

But while the pandemic has opened the door to much-welcomed Chinese aid, it's also made it harder for governments to pay their bills to Beijing. A deep 7.4% recession in the Latin America and Caribbean last year wiped out nearly a decade's worth of growth, according to International Monetary Fund data.

With borrowers squeezed, China has taken a hit. Last year, Ecuador negotiated to delay for a year nearly $900 million in debt payments serviced by oil shipments. Venezuela — by far the region's biggest borrower — is believed to have received a similar grace period. At the same time,

"With the region facing unprecedented challenges, China is unlikely to lend any more for now," said Margaret Myers, head of the Asia-Latin America program at the Dialogue. "Instead it has to grapple with its own problematic portfolio."

The slowdown in lending to Latin America reflects a broader, global pullback, as China turns inward to bolster its own recovery efforts amid the pandemic. The ruling Communist Party has lent billions of dollars to build ports, railways and other infrastructure across Asia to Africa, Europe and Latin America in order to expand China's access to markets and resources.

But Beijing has grown more cautious after some borrowers struggled to repay loans. Officials say they will examine projects and financing more carefully.

The China Development Bank and the foreign ministry didn't respond to questions about the reasons for the decline in Chinese loans to Latin America.

Even though lending has dried up, Chinese buying of Latin America's soybeans, iron ore and other commodities remained robust, at an estimated $136 billion. That's despite a sharp rise of China's purchases of American farm goods, a promise reached with the Trump administration to end a debilitating trade war.

Chinese state-run energy companies also aggressively bought up at fire sale prices energy assets from exiting Western investors. Overall, Chinese mergers and acquisitions surged to $7 billion in 2020, nearly double the amount of activity in 2019, according to the research.

Among the deals: the sale of Peru's largest electric company by San Diego, CA-based Sempra Energy to China Three Gorges Corp. Another $5 billion deal giving State Grid Corp. of China control of a major utility in Chile was announced last year but not included in the data because it hasn't been finalized.

For the region's leaders, Chinese loans for big ticket infrastructure projects are hard to resist. Interest rates are low and unlike loans from the World Bank and IMF there are fewer strings attached and approval is faster, allowing leaders to tout accomplishments in time for the next election.

Even Colombia — Washington's staunchest regional ally and a country that was cool to China's entreaties — recently jumped on the bandwagon. Last year, a consortium including China Harbour Engineering Company broke ground on the capital Bogota's first metro, a $3.9 billion project. No American firms placed bids for the project, which did not directly benefit from any Chinese loans.

U.S. officials have tried to push back, pointing out that U.S. overseas assistance is longstanding and more transparent.

"Beijing's assistance in the region is generally aimed at advancing the People's Republic of China's commercial or political interests," the State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs said in a statement.

In January, at the end of the Trump administration, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation signed an unprecedented agreement with Ecuador to finance up to $2.8 billion in infrastructure projects, money that it said could be used to "refinance predatory Chinese debt."

But the DFC's total funding — $60 billion — pale in comparison to the $1 trillion that China has earmarked for its "Belt and Road" initiative to expand influence around the world.

The U.S. loan package to Ecuador was significant because it also would require the government to privatize oil and infrastructure assets and to ban Chinese technology.

"This definitely would limit China's influence," said Myers. "But by burdening future generations with more debt, and encouraging the use of fossil fuels, does it really help Ecuador in the long run? If it doesn't, then it could backfire against the U.S."

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Associated Press writer Joe McDonald in Beijing contributed to this report.

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Joshua Goodman on Twitter: @APJoshGoodman


Feb 26, 2021

#Coinbase files to become first listed major US #Bitcoin #Cryptocurrency exchange

Coinbase files to become first listed major US cryptocurrency exchange | Financial Times
Coinbase's public debut is likely to rank as one of this year's largest new tech listings © Getty Images

Coinbase generated $1.3bn in revenue last year, up from $534m the year prior, enabling the company to turn a profit of $322m in 2020 after losing $30m in 2019, according to a filing with US securities regulators.

From the FT:

Coinbase files to become first listed major US cryptocurrency exchange

Trading platform earns more than $300m in profits in 2020 on bitcoin surge

February 25, 2021 

The company's public debut, the first for a large US cryptocurrency exchange, is likely to rank as one of this year's largest new tech listings and would mark a milestone for backers of the emerging sector. Coinbase is aiming to list in late March, said one person familiar with the company's thinking.

Coinbase filed for a direct listing rather than a traditional initial public offering, meaning it will not raise additional capital when it goes public.

Brian Armstrong, chief executive of Coinbase, warned that prospective investors should expect volatility in the company's financials.

"We may earn a profit when revenues are high, and we may lose money when revenues are low, but our goal is to roughly operate the company at break even, smoothed out over time, for the time being," Armstrong wrote in a letter attached to the filing.

Almost all of Coinbase's revenue came from transaction fees last year, it said in the filing, underlining the company's dependence on cryptocurrency trading fees.

Shares in the company have recently changed hands in private markets at prices that would give it a roughly $100bn valuation, according to people briefed on the trades, up from $8bn less than three years ago.

Coinbase could use those trades, in addition to input from public investors and its financial advisers, to determine its opening price on public markets.

The company said institutional activity made up almost two-thirds of its total trading volume in the fourth quarter, when transaction revenues jumped more than 70 per cent from the previous quarter to $476m. It said it had 2.8m monthly transacting users in 2020, almost tripling from the year prior.

Coinbase said it oversaw about $90bn in total assets stored on the platform, representing more than 11 per cent of the total market for cryptocurrencies at the end of last year. It has also made venture capital investments in more than 100 companies.

Among the company's biggest investors, controlling more than 5 per cent of stock each, are Andreessen Horowitz, Paradigm, Ribbit Capital, Tiger Global Management, and Union Square Ventures.

See the whole article on the FT here:  https://www.ft.com/content/536db489-d607-411f-ae71-8ef072b2d4bb?


#MicroStrategy CEO @MichaelSaylor on Buying #Bitcoin As A Store of Value vs. Holding Depreciating #Dollars

Civilization needs Clean Water, Clean Air, Clean Energy and Clean Money to advance.

MicroStrategy CEO Saylor on Bitcoin Buying Spree at Bloomberg's #Crypto Conference 

Feb 22, 2021

#Tigray’s War Against #Ethiopia Isn’t About Autonomy. It’s About Economic Power.

Ethiopian soldiers and thousands of mourners attend the official state funeral of Ethiopia's late prime minister, Meles Zenawi

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is fighting the country's revanchist old regime, which is intent on recapturing the economic and political influence it once held.

Tigray's War Against Ethiopia Isn't About Autonomy. It's About Economic Power.

By Kassahun Melesse
Originally published November 19, 2020, 5:20 PM
It has been two weeks since a military conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region between regional forces and the Ethiopian federal army began. Some analysts fear that it could escalate further, leading to the disintegration of the country, which would have significant economic and political repercussions for all countries in the Horn of Africa. But the fundamental causes of the conflict are misunderstood.

Outside observers and analysts tend to see the proximate cause as a recent disagreement between the regional leaders and the federal government—which is led by Nobel Peace Prize-winning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—regarding the constitutionality of the parliament's decision to postpone the national and regional elections due to COVID-19. Tigray's regional leaders held an election in defiance of that decision, in which the governing the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) won all seats, and the result was subsequently declared null and void by the country's parliament.

Others identify the prevailing ideological differences between Abiy and the TPLF as the key source of friction. These arguments, however, do not explain why such differences would give rise to a military confrontation. That's because they are not the underlying causes of the conflict at all.
This war is ultimately a battle for control of Ethiopia's economy, its natural resources, and the billions of dollars the country receives annually from international donors and lenders. Access to those riches is a function of who heads the federal government—which the TPLF controlled for nearly three decades before Abiy came to power in April 2018, following widespread protests against the TPLF-led government.

In other words, this is not a conflict over who gets to rule Tigray, a small region whose population accounts for a mere 6 percent of Ethiopia's more than 110 million people. It is a fight over who gets to dominate the commanding heights of the country's economy, a prize that Tigray's regional leaders once held and are determined to recapture at any cost.

The TPLF was the dominant force in Ethiopian politics for nearly 30 years, after it ousted the military government of Mengistu Hailemariam in 1991 in a protracted armed struggle alongside the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, which was led by the current president of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki. After the fall of the military government, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, and the TPLF's former leader, the late Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi, ruled the country with an iron fist until his death in 2012.

The current director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, was also a member of the TPLF leadership and served as Ethiopia's health minister for many years under Meles. Before Abiy's rise to power, all the country's heads of intelligence and the military chiefs came from the TPLF or were members of the military wing of the party during the armed struggle against Mengitsu. After coming to power, the TPLF-led government converted its forces into an ostensibly Ethiopian army, after completely disbanding the old Ethiopian army. This ensured that most of the top generals and other military leaders in the new army came from the TPLF's ranks as well.

The TPLF's political and military power eventually gave rise to economic dominance as it enabled its leaders to exercise complete control of the country's economy and natural resources.

The TPLF's political and military power eventually gave rise to economic dominance as it enabled its leaders to exercise complete control of the country's economy and natural resources—mainly its land—as well as aid flows and loans. In recent years, Ethiopia received, on average, about $3.5 billion per year in foreign aid alone, which accounted for about half of the country's national budget during the late Meles years. The TPLF-led government also took significant amounts of loans from private creditors and governments, mainly from China, which had reached 60 percent of the country's GDP when Abiy came to power. In fact, Abiy's new administration, which inherited meager foreign exchange reserves, has been struggling to service this debt and was forced to request deferral and renegotiation of terms of these loans from creditors.

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A man enters a polling station on the day of Tigray's regional elections, on Sept. 9, 2020 in Mekelle.
Furthermore, the constitution that the TPLF-led government introduced in 1994, which allowed only public ownership of land, gave government officials unfettered access to abundant land resources in the southern parts of the country, particularly in Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela regions, which they leased to foreign and domestic investors in a long-term lease, amassing billions of dollars in the process. According to Human Rights Watch, by January 2011 the Ethiopian government had leased out 3.6 million hectares of land, an area equivalent to the size of the Netherlands, to foreign investors.

Moreover, the TPLF was also able to dominate virtually all sectors of the Ethiopian economy through the companies under its massive conglomerate, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), by far the largest conglomerate in the country. Until recently, EFFORT was administered by Meles's widow, Azeb Mesfin, and TPLF officials are still board members of the major companies under this conglomerate, which enjoyed access to loans from a financial sector that is dominated by the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and Development Bank of Ethiopia.

The TPLF's dominance was not confined to the economy; it also directly intervened in the selection of the leaders of the major religions, which it regarded as instruments of social control. During the TPLF's rule, both patriarchs of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, with over 40 million followers in the country, came from Tigray. Its leaders also intervened in selecting Ethiopia's Islamic Affairs Supreme Council, which was eventually met with resistance from some Muslim activists and leaders, whom the government jailed, leading to widespread protests by Muslims throughout the country in 2012.

Driven by massive investment in infrastructure and the education and health sectors, mainly financed with foreign aid and loans, the TPLF-led government, with Meles at the helm, oversaw significant economic progress in the country over the nearly three decades it held power. The regime was also authoritarian, frequently jailing opposition politicians and journalists and liberally using its defense and security forces to quell anti-government protests.

Human rights group such as Amnesty International as well as the U.S. State Department frequently accused government security forces of severe human violations, including torture, against members of the opposition parties and individuals suspected of working with groups that were waging armed struggle against the government, such as the Oromo Liberation Front, Ogaden National Liberation Front, and Ginbot 7—one of the major multiethnic parties in the country opposed to the system of ethnic federalism.

Although the United States and the European Union knew of the government's poor human rights record, the economic progress they saw and Ethiopia's key role in fighting al-Shabab militants in neighboring Somalia meant that they were reluctant to exert sufficient pressure on the TPLF-led government to undertake democratic reforms, even when government security forces shot and killed hundreds of demonstrators in Addis Ababa in 2005, who were protesting the election results the government claimed to have won. They looked the other way again when the government claimed to have won all seats in the parliament during the last general election in 2015, which opposition parties claimed was rigged.

It was clear for many years that the TPLF's political dominance could not go on indefinitely.

It was clear for many years that the TPLF's political dominance could not go on indefinitely.
Widespread protests broke out in 2018 in the Oromia and Amhara regions, homes of the two largest ethnic groups in the country, forcing the TPLF-led coalition, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, to replace then-Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, who succeeded Meles following his sudden death in 2012. (Although Hailemariam was from a minority ethnic group in the South, he did not pose a serious threat to the TPLF's dominance. Abiy does pose such a threat, because he is an ethnic Oromo—the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia.)

This is when the leaders of two parties in the TPLF-led coalition, the Amhara National Democratic Movement and Oromo People's Democratic Organization, which were hitherto playing second fiddle to the TPLF, secretly decided to join forces and break the TPLF's hegemony by voting for Abiy as the leader of the coalition, a move that the TPLF leadership didn't see coming and never forgave.

Since coming to power in 2018, Abiy's new federal administration has directly threatened the TPLF's long-standing economic dominance in Ethiopia as a whole by seeking to limit its sphere of influence to the small Tigray region.

Abiy has unveiled or carried out important economic measures that threaten the economic dominance of the leaders of the TPLF. These include his administration's plan to privatize the state-owned Ethio Telecom, the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, and companies in the energy sector with assets of over $7 billion.

More recently, the government introduced new currency notes, which, according to the prime minister, are designed to fight corruption and smuggling; some observers noted that this was principally aimed at controlling the money outside the financial system that is held by former government officials and their economic entities that authorities suspect are engaged in illegal trade and illicit activities.

Indeed, on Nov. 17, the federal attorney general announced that the government had frozen the bank accounts of 34 of these companies for funding "ethnic-based attacks and terrorist activities, having links with and providing financial assistance to TPLF, tax avoidance and corruption."

Abiy's reforms have also reduced TPLF influence in the security sector. Immediately after taking power, Abiy released thousands of political prisoners and journalists the government had imprisoned, unbanned groups that were waging armed struggles against the Ethiopian government, and signed a peace treaty with Eritrea, with which the TPLF-led government fought a border war that claimed the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers from both sides.

Then he sacked the fearsome and reclusive security chief, Getachew Assefa, and replaced the military chief. He soon began undertaking reforms in the military and security sectors aimed at bringing about more balanced representation of the ethnic groups. This made it clear to TPLF leaders that Abiy posed a serious threat to their long-standing dominance in the Ethiopian armed forces and economy. And they acted to regain control.

On June 23, 2018, nearly three months after Abiy came to power, there was an assassination attempt against him during a rally in Addis Ababa. The government shortly after identified the former TPLF security chief, Getachew, as the mastermind, but he had already fled to the Tigray region. A federal court issued an arrest warrant for him for the attempt and other human right rights violations, but the Tigrayan regional government refused to hand him over. His former deputy, however, was arrested while fleeing security forces.

Since the TPLF lost control of the federal government, the frequency of ethnic-based conflicts in all regional states, except in Tigray, has spiked significantly.

Since the TPLF lost control of the federal government, the frequency of ethnic-based conflicts in all regional states, except in Tigray, has spiked significantly.
While there is deep ethnic rivalry in the country, it does not explain how millions have been displaced; how hundreds of Orthodox Christians and ethnic Amharas living in the South were massacred and their homes, churches, and businesses burned down; how ethnic Amhara students were kidnapped; or how important Oromo figures such as the musician Hachalu Hundessa were killed, sparking protests that led to the deaths of over 150 civilians.

Many of these attacks appear to have been orchestrated and financed by those who lost out from Abiy's rise to power and the reforms he has been undertaking; they are determined to make the country utterly ungovernable unless they are the ones ruling it. And there is overwhelming consensus that the TPLF's leaders were the main losers from Abiy's reforms while also possessing the capacity to plan and carry out such attacks—by employing the financial muscle and security network they built over three decades of political dominance.

It is clear that the current conflict is not over who gets to govern Tigray because the postponement of national and regional elections extended the tenure of the legislative and executive branches of all regional governments in the country, including in Tigray, which is still ruled by the TPLF. Nor is it a clash between federalists and unitarists; Ethiopia's federal system remains intact, as evidenced by a 10th regional state that was recently created.

Rather, what's at the heart of the ongoing conflict are Abiy's economic and political reforms and the unrelenting pace at which they were unveiled—moves that TPLF leaders perceive as unacceptably threatening to the economic and political dominance they have long enjoyed and the considerable influence they still wield across Ethiopia.

That dominance is something the TPLF is willing to fight to preserve, as evidenced by the decision to carry out what a top TPLF official described as a "preemptive strike" against the federal army's Northern Command, triggering the current conflict. The risk now is that the TPLF's persistent and increasingly audacious actions could make Abiy's peaceful reforms impossible and thereby make a violent transition inevitable.

Kassahun Melesse is an assistant professor of applied economics at Oregon State University who lived in Ethiopia for over 25 years.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/19/tigray-tplf-war-against-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-isnt-about-autonomy-its-about-economic-power/


______________________________

Feb 16, 2021

The Law is The Law: Not pretty….#Citigroup loses bid to recover $500m sent to #Revlon #Debt Holders by mistake

US judge rules recipients can keep the money in case involving loan made to Revlon.

Despite finding that the money Citi sent was “indisputably transferred by mistake”, Jesse Furman, a US district judge in Manhattan, wrote that he was bound by precedent to rule in favour of the funds.

“Were the court writing on a blank slate,” the judge wrote, he might have ruled in favour of Citi, given that the bank “realised its error and notified the lenders within one day”.

But New York law is explicit, he found: a recipient may keep funds transferred by mistake if they pay off a debt, the recipient did not know of the mistake and the recipient did not trick the sender into making the payment.

Judge Furman said the recipients had good reason to believe the payments were intentional. “To believe that Citibank, one of the most sophisticated financial institutions in the world, had made a mistake that had never happened before, to the tune of nearly $1bn — would have been borderline irrational,” he wrote.

Feb 10, 2021

#Venezuela is so far behind sourcing #Covid19 #Vaccines that it could be 2023 or later before herd immunity could be achieved

Utter disaster, as to be expected...

More than any other nation in the Western Hemisphere, this broken socialist state might need a miracle to defeat the novel coronavirus

From the Washington Post:

Neutralize the coronavirus without a single side effect! No needle? No problem! Just a few drops of the magic liquid under the tongue every four hours and it’s goodbye lockdown, hello good health.

“From Venezuela to the world,” Nicolás Maduro declared in a national address, unveiling two shimmering vials of Carvativir.

Venezuelan medical professionals now say that Maduro’s “miracle drops” — which he pledged would rapidly go into mass production — are actually an extract of the herb thyme, used in homeopathic therapies and ordinary cooking.

Yet one aspect of the marketing blitz did ring true. More than any other nation in the Western Hemisphere, this broken socialist state might need a miracle to defeat the novel coronavirus.

Venezuela is so far behind in sourcing vaccines that analysts say it could be 2023 or later before it acquires enough to achieve herd immunity. That places it in the bottom rung of nations — alongside authoritarian peers North Korea, Syria and Myanmar — 

Maduro’s government missed a critical deadline last month to buy into a World Health Organization-linked vaccine program designed to help developing nations obtain supplies of coronavirus vaccine. Paolo Balladelli, the WHO’s Venezuela chief, tweeted Tuesday that the country still can get up to 2.4 million doses — a decent start for a country of 28.5 million — if it buys into the program by Tuesday.


See the whole story on the Washington Post here: 


Returning his investors’ money was the best bet #MichaelPlatt of #BlueCrest Capital has placed in the last couple of years...

Image result for BlueCrest Capital
Blue Crest's 95% Gain Swells Michael Platt's Wealth to $10 Billion 

Last year’s results represent BlueCrest’s biggest gain since Platt said he would return about $7 billion in clients’ money five years ago to focus on trading for himself and for his partners. Not much is known about the firm’s trading strategy since then, but it has given Platt, 52, the broad freedom to take riskier and highly leveraged bets to juice up returns

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-21/platt-s-bluecrest-gained-a-record-95-in-2020-amid-virus-chaos

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